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H ospitals have reduced the average length-of-stay of their Medicare patients. During the first year of implementation of the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) in 1983, the average length-of-stay for Medicare enrollees declined from 10.0 to 9.1 days. This 9 percent reduction is more than four and one-half times the average annual decrease in Medicare length-of-stay over the 1967-1983 period. 1 The reduced length-of-stay has led to considerable fear that patients increasingly are being discharged in need of continued care. 2 There is also considerable speculation that the use of nursing homes, home health services, and specialized hospitals will increase as hospitals seek to discharge patients more quickly and in greater need of follow-up care. 3 Prior to enactment of PPS, cost-based, retrospective payment to hospitals prevailed. Within the limits of allowable costs, hospitals and physicians had the economic incentive to do everything that was beneficial to the patient. Under PPS, hospitals are paid a flat fee for each type of case, as determined by the diagnosis-related group (DRG) into which the patient is classified. Among other things, this payment mechanism provides incentives for hospitals to find ways to reduce the cost of providing care to patients. Reduction in length-of-stay as a result of a more intense application of care is one potentially successful strategy. Another strategy is to discharge the patient to a nonhospital setting for recuperation, thus shifting the costs of care away from the hospital.
The purpose of this study is to examine the extent to which patients have been increasingly transferred to nonacute care settings after a stay in an acute care hospital. Specifically, we address five issues. First, to what extent has the proportion of Medicare patients transferred to skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), intermediate care facilities (ICFs), home health agencies, and other facilities (long-term or specialty nonacute hospitals) increased since the adoption of PPS? Second, have all hospitals seen changes in transfer practice, or have certain hospital types, such as investor-owned or private voluntary hospitals, been more inclined to increase transfers? Third, has the length-of-stay prior to discharge fallen as rapidly for transferred patients as for those discharged to home? A case can be made that because those transferred to nonhospital facilities tend to be sicker than those discharged to their homes, length-of-stay may not have declined as precipitously. Alternatively, if the bulk of the hospital stay of transferred patients is essentially monitored bed rest, hospitals may be encouraging such patients to be discharged more quickly than before. Fourth, to what extent do transferred patients require more intensive hospital treatment, and has the level of required hospital treatment increased since the imposition of PPS? Finally, within specific DRGs, has the level of severity of transferred cases increased since the 54 HEALTH AFFAIRS | Winter 1988 payment change? We also examine whether non-Medicare patients experienced similar changes in their patterns of care. Using 1983 Using , 1984 Using , and 1985 Pennsylvania hospital data, the Hospital Research Foundation found that Medicare length-of-stay declined by 20.7 percent between 1983 and 1985, and transfers to nursing homes, other hospitals, home health agencies, and rehabilitation centers increased by 36.2 percent. 4 That is, just over 19 percent of Medicare patients were transferred in 1985, and of these approximately 40 percent went to SNFs. In a related study, the American Health Care Association (AHCA) examined the implementation of New Jersey's all-payer DRG system. After comparing 1979 and 1982 nursing home admissions, the AHCA concluded that New Jersey nursing homes were not directly affected; residents were not admitted in higher numbers, were not more debilitated, and did not require more services in their first thirty days of stay. 5 These studies must be viewed with caution since they may not be generalizable. This is particularly true of the New Jersey system, which, at that time, paid hospitals when placement in an SNF or home health agency could not be found. Further, the treatment of length-of-stay outliers was more liberal under the New Jersey system than under PPS. 
Methods
Data for this study came from discharge abstracts submitted to the Commission on Professional and Hospital Activities (CPHA) on a sample of 467 hospitals and from American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Hospital Survey data on those same hospitals. To be in our sample, a hospital had to be a nonfederal, short-term general hospital and be part of the CPHA's data collection system during the third quarter (July-September) of 1980, 1983, 1984, and 1985 . Of the 882 hospitals we contacted, 608 (68.9 percent) agreed to release their data. We deleted thirty-four hospitals in states with Medicare waivers, since they were not subject to PPS. Some additional hospitals were dropped because thirdquarter 1985 data were not provided to CPHA. In a few cases, AHA data were not available; we then used values imputed by the AHA. This resulted in patient data from 467 hospitals.
We selected third-quarter data to reduce the number of records analyzed and because the third quarter of 1984 was the first one in which almost all eligible hospitals had begun to implement PPS. 7 The pre-PPS quarters, 1980 and 1983, provided a baseline. During the 1984 period, about one-fourth of a hospital's Medicare operating revenue was subject to DRG-based payment. By the third quarter of 1985, the prospectively determined share of operating revenue had doubled.
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All hospitals in the sample were grouped by teaching and ownership status as of 1980: flagship teaching; other member of the Council of Teaching Hospitals (COTH); other public SMSA (standard metropolitan statistical area); other public non-SMSA; other voluntary SMSA; other voluntary non-SMSA; and investor-owned. A flagship teaching hospital, as designated by the American Association of Medical Colleges (AAMC), either is owned by a medical school or is a separate nonprofit or public hospital in which the majority of the medical school's department chairs and hospital chiefs of service are the same person.
Compared to nonfederal, short-term general hospitals in 1980, hospitals in our sample were larger, more likely to be found in the North Central census division, and less likely to be in the South. Only one-third of the investor-owned hospitals in our sample were part of chains. This understated the extent of chain involvement in investor-owned hospitals. Because of the small size of the investor-owned sample, we do not distinguish such hospitals on the basis of SMSA status.
For this analysis we deleted all cases in which the patient was discharged dead. Because of the large number of records, we randomly selected records within each hospital type as follows: 100 percent of all records from flagship teaching and investor-owned hospitals, 50 percent of records from other COTH hospitals, 25 percent from nonmetropolitan public general hospitals, and 10 percent from all other hospital categories. This purposive sampling method reflects the availability of hospitals in each cell. The numbers reported have been reweighted to reflect the actual complement of patients.
We used the Medicare Case-mix Index (MCI) to measure case-mix. Developed by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), the MCI is the mechanism through which hospitals are paid under Medicare. 8 The index is an average of the DRG weights multiplied by the number of cases treated in the hospital. The average MCI value for shortterm general hospitals is 1.00 by design; in our sample the mean value was 1.12 in 1980, indicating a more complex case-mix, on average. Since our interest is in Medicare patients and the MCI was developed explicitly for such patients, its use is appropriate. We also examined case-mix changes for non-Medicare patients. For these patients we also report MCI-based measures. In preliminary work we used a broader case-mix measure derived from data on all hospital patients. However, this measure has a high correlation with the MCI (.88) and in other ongoing work has yielded the same implications.
One of our objectives was to examine the extent to which more or less severely ill patients were being transferred after 1983, the year PPS was introduced. To analyze this issue, we examined five DRG groups that had 56 HEALTH AFFAIRS | Winter 1988 been identified as likely to reflect increased posthospital transfers as a result of PPS. 9 These were: specific cerebrovascular disorders except transient ischemic attacks (DRG 14) ; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (DRG 88); simple pneumonia and pleurisy (DRGs 89-91); heart failure and shock (DRG 127); and hip fractures and major joint replacements (DRGs 209-212). For these patients we used the staging algorithms developed by Joseph Gonnella and his colleagues to measure the severity of a particular case. 10 Staging is a method of refining traditional diagnostic classifications; it involves defining different levels of severity for specific medical/ surgical problems: stage I-a condition with no complications or problems of minimal severity; stage II-a condition with local complications or problems of moderate severity; and stage III-a condition with systemic complications or problems of maximal severity. 11 At this point, staging can be applied only to each diagnosis, not to the patient overall. We have calculated the stage of each patient within our five DRG groups using the stage value for the primary diagnosis.
Patterns Of Patient Transfers
The proportion of Medicare patients transferred to subacute settings has almost doubled since the advent of PPS (Exhibit 1). In 1983, 9.78 percent of live Medicare patients discharged frorn hospitals were transferred, compared to 19.32 percent in 1985. This is in marked contrast to the 1980-1983 period, when Medicare transfers declined by more than The pattern of decreasing frequency of transfers prior to PPS and increasing frequency after PPS began was evident for all hospital types (Exhibit 2). Transfer to the various forms of posthospital care facilities varied significantly by hospital type, however, as did the rate at which different hospitals appear to have responded to the PPS incentives. This is generally not a function of systematically different reliance on Medicare as a payer source. In our data, the average percentage of Medicare admissions is equal across groups, with the exception of the COTH flagship hospitals, which were less dependent on Medicare.
Metropolitan voluntary hospitals transferred a greater proportion of their Medicare patients to SNFs than did other hospital types between 1983 and 1985. With the exception of flagship teaching hospitals, all hospital types were reasonably similar in their SNF transfer practices. In contrast, hospitals differed dramatically in their use of home health care. Nonmetropolitan public hospitals transferred less than 4 percent of their Medicare discharges to home health agencies. Flagship teaching hospitals sent more than 11 percent to such agencies in 1985. The pattern of transfers shown by the flagship hospitals may be a reflection of their unusual patient mix. The disproportionate use of home health and other nonacute facilities by flagship hospitals, even among the Medicare population, may be a reflection of their large (and increasing) indigent care load. We have found that the proportion of "self-pay" patients in flag ship hospitals increased by 70 percent between 1980 and 1985. It is worth noting that this increased indigent load does not appear to have resulted from patient "dumping." 12 There have been dramatic changes in the pattern of transfers by hospital type. Investor-owned hospitals increased their use of SNFs by almost 150 percent between 1983 and 1985, other nonacute facility transfers tripled, and home health transfers were increased more than sixteenfold. In 1983, the investor-owned hospitals in our sample sent five Medicare patients per thousand to a home health agency; in 1985 they transferred seventy-seven per thousand. Between 1983 and 1985, the investor-owned hospitals had the lowest rate of increase in transfers to ICFs. In general, nonteaching public general hospitals expanded posthospital transfers the least, and teaching hospitals increased transfers to ICFs and other nonacute facilities by more than most other hospitals. For Medicare patients who were not transferred, the average length-ofstay declined by 0.9 days in the post-PPS period (Exhibit 3). This decrease occurred entirely in the first year of implementation. Non-Medicare length-of-stay declined by 0.4 days over the same period, but the decline was evenly divided between the two years. Transferred Medicare patients also exhibited declining lengths-of-stay prior to PPS. However, in every case the rate of decrease rose sharply after PPS began. Between 1983 and 1985 the length-of-stay prior to transfer decreased by three days for SNF transfers, 2.2 days for ICF transfers, 2.5 days for patients transferred to home health agency care, and 4.2 days for transfers to other nonacute care facilities. Mean lengths-of-stay increased slightly in ICF and home health transfers in the second year of PPS. NonMedicare patients generally experienced similar patterns of change in length-of-stay. However, non-Medicare patients transferred to ICFs had a 38 percent increase in mean length-of-stay after the implementation of PPS. This followed a 47 percent decline in length-of-stay prior to PPS. The non-Medicare results should be interpreted with caution, however, due to substantially reduced sample sizes.
In every instance, patients discharged to posthospital care had higher mean Medicare case weights than those discharged to home (Exhibit 4). This was true for both Medicare and non-Medicare patients. It is somewhat surprising that the case weights for those Medicare patients discharged to SNFs are comparable to those discharged to home health agencies. This may be a reflection of the availability of a caregiver at home when home health services are recommended or systematic differences in patient characteristics not considered explicitly in categorizing cases by DRGs, such as the distinction between the old and the very old.
More significant, however, is the general increase in the MCI value of the Medicare patients discharged over this period. Prior to PPS there was less than a 1 percent increase per year in the case-mix of patients discharged to home. In the first year of PPS, case-mix for this group increased by almost 2 percent. Paul Ginsburg and Grace Carter have attributed most of the first-PPS-year increase in case-mix to improvements in coding. 13 We found that the second-year increase was over two and one-half times larger than the 1983-1984 change. Much of this change also may be a result of computer-assisted coding systems, which were increasingly available to hospitals. On the other hand, given the significantly lower admission rates for patients over age sixty-five, it is likely that a sizable proportion of the recent change can be attributed to more costly patients. Our study of the pre-and post-PPS use of technologies in hospitals suggests that case-mix did increase over the period. 14 Corroborating this view are the results for transferred patients. During 1983-1984 the case weights for SNF and other nonacute facility discharges increased over twice as fast as did the MCI for nontransferred patients. In contrast, during the 1984-1985 period, increases were smaller for transferred than for nontransferred patients (with the exception of home health). Indeed, the case weight of SNF transfers declined slightly in 1985. If the increase in case-mix was solely an artifact of improved coding, one would expect that transferred patients would exhibit casemix increases at or above those discharged to home. The greater debility of these patients suggests more "gray areas" in which to recode the diagnosis legitimately. While the 1984 results are consistent with the recode view, the 1985 data are not. This suggests that the resource needs of transferred patients, at least at the time of hospital admission, may have increased in the post-PPS period.
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Further suggestive evidence that the resource needs of transferred patients has increased is found in Exhibit 5, which reports the mean severity level of patients in five high-transfer DRGs. If significant numbers of cases were being carefully reviewed by hospitals and coded into higher-weight DRGs, then the average level of severity in these expanding DRGs should decline as the less severe "marginal patients" were added to the group. As is apparent from Exhibit 5, with the exception of DRG 14 (stroke patients), the average severity level has remained virtually unchanged. The implication of the results from Exhibits 4 and 5 is that the level of resource need at the time of hospital admission has increased for Medicare patients who will ultimately be transferred for posthospital care. 
Policy And Management Issues
The results of this analysis raise a number of issues for health policy and health care management. First, we have found that the proportion of Medicare patients transferred to posthospital care has doubled since Medicare PPS was implemented. At this point, to what extent supply constraints have limited the transfer of patients is an open question. That is, in most markets an increase in the demand for services would lead to an increase in the quantity of services supplied. The home health industry illustrates this. The number of agencies increased by 41 percent between 1983 and 1985. 15 Indeed, the increase in transfers has been greatest to home health agencies.
Growth in other sectors, particularly the nursing home industry, may be inhibited by certificate-of-need legislation and regulations that make the conversion of hospital facilities costly. 16 As a consequence, our results may reflect only a portion of the patients who otherwise would have been transferred. Alternatively, William Scanlon has argued that SNFs can expand the number of Medicare residents they accept at the cost of turning away Medicaid residents. 17 If this has been the case, our results reflect the actual propensity of hospitals to transfer, but access to SNFs by those eligible for Medicaid will have been reduced. Clearly, more research at the nursing home level is needed. Further consideration also should be given to easing entry of new providers into the nursing home market.
Second, the differential pattern of transfers by hospital type warrants closer examination. Our data indicate that non-COTH-member public general hospitals are generally less likely to transfer patients to posthospital care. Since these hospitals have case-mixes similar to other nonteaching institutions, in-hospital cost savings may be achieved by more aggressive transfer policies. Investor-owned hospitals generally have been found to be similar to nonprofit hospitals. 18 It is apparent from our results that, prior to PPS, these hospitals were much less likely to transfer patients. During the first two years of PPS, these hospitals increased their Medicare transfers more rapidly than most other types of hospitals. As a consequence, by 1985, the investor-owned hospitals in our sample were comparable to other types of hospitals. It will be important to determine whether disproportionate increases in transfers by any group of hospitals reflect greater availability of posthospital care, differences in case-mix, or perhaps inappropriately aggressive transfer policies.
Third, we found that Medicare patients were being transferred to posthospital care more quickly in 1985 than prior to PPS. However, the second-year reduction in length-of-stay is substantially smaller than in the first year. This suggests that the easy reductions in length-of-stay have been accomplished and that additional cuts may occur only with "staysaving" technological advance. It may be useful to examine the time pattern of ancillary charges to patients by DRG. Such patterns would be suggestive of the range of stay over which essentially recuperation services could be provided in other settings.
Fourth, judging by the relative case weights, our data suggest that patients ultimately transferred to posthospital care tend to use hospital services more intensely. Further, the average case weight has been increasing. It does not necessarily follow that upon transfer these same patients are more intense users of posthospital care. It may be that the episode of hospital care reflects an acute intervention followed by a period of recuperation. If so, posthospital care may be no more resource demanding than previously. Further, analysis of nursing home data suggests that diagnosis-based measures are poor predictors of resource use. 19 Nonetheless, our results suggest that patients transferred to subacute care post-PPS may indeed be "sicker" than those transferred in the pre-PPS period.
Finally, our results suggest that Medicare (and non-Medicare) patients have been transferred sooner, and perhaps at a higher state of resource need, since the implementation of PPS. From these data we are unable to judge whether such transfers are appropriate. Clinical research in this area is clearly important. It is also important to develop and test payment systems that provide incentives for appropriate transfers. Such methods could include capitated payments or the bundling of hospital and subacute payments into a single case payment.
